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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
LECIA SWALLOW, f.k.a.
LECIA KENNARD,
Appellant/Petitioner,
-vs-

Appellate Court Case No. 20070198

RANDY KENNARD,

Lower Court Case No. 044402268

Appellee/Respondent

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

COMES NOW Appellant, Lecia Swallow f.k.a. Lecia Kennard (also "Swallow" or
"Wife"), by and through counsel, and hereby submits the following as Appellant's Reply
Brief:
ARGUMENT
I.

UNDER THE FACTS OF THE CASE REFLECTED IN THE COURT
DOCKET, THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN
DENYING WIFE'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT.
Despite Appellee's arguments to the contrary, the facts before the trial court

should have led it to grant Wife's motion to set aside the default judgement. Although
Appellee argues "facts" supporting the appropriate denial of Appellant's Motion to Set

Aside, many of the "facts" were authored by him when he submitted them to the court as
findings of fact and conclusions of law. They appear nowhere else in the record.
In Classic Cabinets. Inc. v. All American Life Insurance Company. 978 P.2d 465
(Utah App. 1999), this court held that "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect," may be found where documents were not properly forwarded as had been
anticipated, and a default judgment had been entered. Id. At 466. In the instant case, not
only was there ample evidence before the trial court of problems with receipt of mail by
Appellant's counsel, but the record shows that the trial court clerk never mailed a copy of
any order to Appellant's counsel. This clearly creates "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect" as outlined in U.R.C.P. Rule 60(b) where a mailed notice of court
action was never sent.
There is no "apparent carelessness or neglect to the proceedings" as claimed in
Appellee's Brief (page 18). The court docket clearly shows that Appellee filed
responsive pleadings to Appellee's initial Petition to Modify. Wife filed an answer and
counter petition to Appellee's initial Petition. She responded to his requests for
admissions and interrogatories in a timely matter. She responded despite the absence of
an attorney planning order, as required by Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
URCP Rule 26f specifically states:
"The parties shall, as soon as practicable after the commencement of the
action, meet in person or by telephone to discuss the claim... and to develop
a stipulated discovery plan."

-2-

Rule 26 also mandates that this plan shall include the subject of discovery including dates
when discovery should be completed. Such a plan was never filed, as verified by the
lower court docket. Appellee indicates that he mailed a copy of the scheduling order to
the Appellant. However, sending a proposed plan via mail is inconsistent with and
violates the provisions of U.R.C.P. Rule 26f. Even in Appellee's response, he admits
there was no stipulation as to time, form, and deadlines for discovery.
Appellee argues that he sent the proposed order via mail because he was having
difficulty reaching Appellant's counsel. Even if this were the case, Rule 26 provides
relief and instruction. U.R.C.P. Rule 26f(4) states that "if the parties are unable to agree
to the terms of a discovery plan or any part thereof, the plaintiff shall... move the court for
entry of a discovery order." In the instant case, no discovery order was ever entered to
which the parties stipulated. The Appellee never moved the court for entry of a discovery
order as required by Rule 26. Therefore, Appellee could not propound discovery nor
compel Appellant to provide answers to discovery. Thus, an order compelling discovery
and a default judgment based upon Appellant's alleged non-compliance could not be
entered.
Further, when there is sufficient confusion as to the procedural state of the case,
"default judgments should be set aside to allow trial on the merits." Locke v. Peterson
285 P.2d 111 (Utah 1955). The state of the instant case was in substantial flux when the
memorandum supporting Appellee's motion to compel and subsequent notice to submit
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and motion for default judgment were filed with the trial court and default was entered.
Appellee filed his Motion to Compel Petitioner's Answer to Remaining Requests for
Interrogatories and Production of Documents before he was given leave to amend his
pleadings and without any supporting memorandum or affidavit of Appellee. It was not
until September 12, 2006 that the Appellee filed his supporting memorandum and
affidavit on his motion to compel. Moreover, Appellee's motion to compel discovery
occurred weeks before Appellant was even required to answer Appellee's amended
petition.
Finally, "[w]here a default has been entered and there is any justifiable excuse, the
court should be indulgent in setting aside the judgment to afford the defaulted party an
opportunity for a trial on merits." Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. v. Tolbert 16 Utah
2d 407 (Utah 1965). See also Rules 55©) and 60(b), U.R.C.P; Boardof Educ. v. Cox, 14
Utah 2d 385, 384 P.2d 806 (1963); Mavhew v. Standard Gilsonite Co.. 14 Utah 2d 52,
376 P.2d 951 (1962); Locke v. Peterson. 3 Utah 2d 415, 285 P.2d 1111 (1955). The facts
of the instant case and the record of the proceedings below logically lead one to see there
exists more than one justifiable mistake to support Appellant's Motion to Set Aside
Default Judgment.
As argued in Appellant's opening brief, domestic cases may follow procedure
outlined in Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 6-401 which states that "all
domestic relation matters filed in the district court in counties where court commissioners
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are appointed and serving...shall be referred to the commissioner... unless ordered by the
Presiding Judge of the District." In the instant case, Appellee's Petition to modify was
filed in a district that has a Commissioner. Despite that fact, no motions nor hearings
were ever referred to or heard by the Commissioner. Furthermore, there is no order in the
record nor any indication from the Presiding Judge of the District that the matters were to
by-pass the Commissioner.
In addition, Rule 6-401 Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 6-401,
mandates mediation for resolution of ah domestic cases. Thus, it logically would fall
within the meaning of inadvertence, mistake or excusable neglect, for the Appellant or
her counsel, to believe the trial court would not sign a final judgment and order against
her without the parties first submitting to mediation.
The procedural record alone supplies multiple justifiable reasons for setting aside
the default judgment. No "apparent carelessness or neglect to the proceedings" can be
construed from failure to respond to a motion to compel that was not supported by
affidavit or memorandum. The procedural flux and confusion in the case at the time of
Appellant's motion also support a finding of excusable neglect and inadvertence on the
part of Appellee's counsel. Said events and the reactions (or inaction) by Wife's trial
counsel fall squarely within the parameters set forth in Rule 60 (b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. Thus, the trial court abused its discretion when it did not grant Wife's
motion to set aside the default judgment.
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II.

THIS COURT HAS THE AUTHORITY TO MAKE ITS DECISION ON
ALTERNATE GROUNDS.
This Court may overturn the trial court's decision and remand for further

proceedings on alternative grounds. It is well established that"[a] party to an appeal does
not have a constitutional right to have a cause of action decided on a particular ground."
Debrv v. Noble. 889 P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995). This is true even where such ground or
theory is not urged or argued on appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and
was not considered or passed on by the lower court. State v. Rynhart 2005 UT 84 (Utah
2005). See also. Bailev v. Bavles, 2002 UT 58 (Utah 2002); Dipoma v. McPhie. 2001 UT
61, P 18, 29 P.3d 1225 (quoting Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Ass'n. 23 Utah 2d
222, 225-26 n.2, 461 P.2d 290, 293 n.2 (1969)); Orton v. Carter. 970 P.2d 1254, 1260
(Utah 1998). Thus, it is proper for this court to review and examine the trial court's final
judgment on the merits where the judgment effects the rights and interests of a child.
Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984). This Court should include this consideration
in deciding whether to set aside the default judgment. The wife has an excellent case on
the merits, as pointed out in her opening brief.
In the instant case, the trial court entered a default order of modification
substantially reducing sums the trial court in its own same default judgment now on
appeal specifically found to be entirely in the nature of child support. This judgment
affects not only the Appellant, but also the parties' six minor children. The judgment was
made without hearing, or consideration of the best interest of the children via a Guardian
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ad Litem. To support the trial court's denial of Appellant's motion to set aside is
tantamount to subverting Utah statutes, case law and public policy that a child's best
interests should be strongly considered when entering and enforcing child support orders.
The trial court abused its discretion when entering its denial of Appellant's motion
to set aside and in affirming the default, specifically when the order had significant
ramifications for the best interest of the children. Therefore, it is appropriate for this
Court to reverse the trial court's denial of Appellant's motion to set aside, and to remand
this case for further hearings. The refusal to set aside a default judgment in a case like
this has much greater importance than failure to set aside a default pertaining to a mere
money judgment.
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES
The actions of the Appellee in forcing the motion to compel despite his recently
amended petition to modify and lack of a Rule 26 order, as well as his objection to setting
aside the default and his position on appeal here are not well taken. Wife should
therefore, be awarded her attorney's fees on appeal, in accordance with Rule 34 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
CONCLUSION
The trial court abused its discretion in denying Appellant's Motion to Set Aside
Default Judgement and improperly disregarded the best interest of the minor children as
to child support, in considering the default judgment. Based upon the foregoing, the
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Appellant, respectfully requests that Judge Howard's denial of Appellant's Motion to Set
Aside Judgment be reversed and the case be remanded to set aside the judgment and
consider the petition to modify case on its merits.
DATED THIS

day of

, 2007.

CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C.

Mary C. Corporon
Allison R. Librett
Attorneys for Appellant
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